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Abstract 
The introduction of capacity remuneration mechanisms is being intensively discussed among 
European decision makers, as concerns about generation adequacy in the electricity sector 
are growing among stakeholders. Different mechanisms have already been implemented or 
will be introduced in the near future in several European countries. This policy brief focuses on 
selected experiences in Belgium, France, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The implementation of 
capacity remuneration mechanisms yielded mixed experiences so far, thus making them 
subject to repeated adjustments. Although the mechanisms seem to have achieved their goal 
of purchasing the targeted capacity volumes in different auctions, their efficiency has not yet 
been sufficiently assessed. While on the one hand some mechanisms are removed again (eg. 
capacity payments in Spain or the strategic reserve in Sweden), on the other hand new 
mechanisms are introduced (e.g. decentral obligation in France). The introduction of capacity 
remuneration mechanisms, however, should go alongside a Europe-wide coordination to avoid 
market distortions, as the introduction of a mechanism can interfere with the ongoing process 
of an integrated European electricity market and hinder cross-border electricity trading. At least 
the participation of interconnectors or capacities from non-domestic areas should be admitted 
within national mechanisms. 
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1 Introduction 
As concerns about the adequacy of electricity generation are rising in Europe, decision makers 
try to support new investments in generating capacities and incentivize demand side flexibility 
(e.g. demand response or storages). As this process is still ongoing and there exists a broad 
variety of options, the goal of this document is to provide an up-to-date overview of currently 
implemented or proposed market design options in European electricity markets and other 
already established design options outside Europe. 
Large shares of volatile energy production from wind power and photovoltaics are challenging 
the electricity system and lead to decreasing electricity wholesale prices. Due to the merit-
order-effect, in hours with electricity feed-in from renewable energy sources wholesale prices 
decline significantly. Additionally, electricity generation from renewable energy sources leads 
to fewer full-load hours of conventional power plants. The liberalized market combined with the 
European market coupling increases the efficient use of generation resources and reduces 
returns for power generators in times without scarcity. However, returns above variable costs 
are necessary to cover fixed costs, otherwise, power plants will be decommissioned for 
economic reasons. But flexible power plants in combination with other flexibility options, such 
as demand response or storages, are important for ensuring generation adequacy during 
scarcity situations. 
Energy policy and market design in the countries considered in this report are subject to 
frequent adaptations. However, in this document, only the states of the markets are described 
at the time of writing. The report is structured as follows: first, in Section 2, a general short 
overview of different capacity remuneration mechanisms is given. Afterward, selected 
experiences from electricity markets with established or planned capacity remuneration 
mechanisms are described in Section 3. A short conclusion finalizes the report. 
2 Capacity remuneration options 
Capacity remuneration options can be grouped into different categories. A mechanism can be 
either targeted, i.e. either only apply to selected technologies or to new investments, or market-
wide, i.e. all technologies are able to participate. Furthermore, one can distinguish between 
volume-based mechanisms, i.e. a certain level of capacity is required, or price-based 
mechanisms, which can steer the amount of procured capacity based on a target price. The 
resulting classification of different capacity mechanisms is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Classification of capacity mechanisms [1] 
  Targeted Market-wide 
Volume-based 
Tender for new capacity Central buyer 
Strategic reserve De-central obligation 
Price-based Targeted capacity payment Market-wide capacity payment 
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The basic principles of the different mechanisms are as follows [1]: 
▪ Tender for new capacity: Financial support is provided in order to establish the required 
additional capacity. Different variations are possible, e.g. public financing for the construction 
of new capacity or long-term power purchase agreements. 
▪ Strategic reserve: The required additional capacity is contracted and held in reserve 
outside the energy-only-market. Reserve capacity is only operated when specific conditions 
are met, such as a shortage of capacity in the market or a price settlement above a certain 
electricity price. 
▪ Targeted capacity payment: A central regulator sets the price of capacity, which is then 
paid to a subset of the capacity operating in the market, e.g. only to selected technology types. 
▪ Central buyer: The total amount of required capacity is set centrally and procured 
through a central bidding process so that supply bids determine the price. 
▪ De-central obligation: An obligation is placed on electricity suppliers to individually 
secure the total capacity they need to meet their consumers' demand. In contrast to the central 
buyer model, there is no central bidding process. Instead, individual contracts between 
electricity suppliers and capacity providers are used. 
▪ Market-wide capacity payment: The price of capacity is set centrally, based on 
estimates of the level of capacity payment needed to bring forward sufficient total capacity. 
This price is then paid to all capacity providers in the market. 
3 Selected experiences 
Recently, capacity remuneration mechanisms have been implemented in several European 
countries. In the following paragraphs, selected experiences with a central capacity market, a 
de-central obligation, a strategic reserve and a targeted capacity payment are presented.  
Belgium/Strategic reserve [2–6] 
As a back-up for demand peaks during winter, Belgium implemented a strategic reserve in 
2014. The size of the reserve is dimensioned so that the loss of load expectation (LOLE) is 
less than 3 hours on average and less than 20 hours in 95 percent of the cases. The LOLE is 
analyzed via a probabilistic market model that takes into account outages, demand 
thermosensitivity, such as high electricity consumption on cold winter days, and neighboring 
countries as foreign power plants are not allowed to take part in the reserve. The capacity is 
procured in a competitive tendering process, but if offered prices are regarded as clearly 
unreasonable, a Royal Decree can impose prices and volumes. Market participants that plan 
to shut down capacities are obliged to take part in the tendering process of the strategic reserve 
that can be split into a “Strategic Generation Reserve” (SGR) and a “Strategic Demand 
Reserve” (SDR). For the first period (2014/2015), a total capacity of 846.7 MW (SGR 750.0 
MW/SDR 96.7 MW) was contracted, increasing to 1535.5 MW (SGR 1177.1 MW/SDR: 358.4 
MW) for the subsequent period (2015/2016). The activation is determined via economic 
(shortage of energy in the day-ahead market) or technical (shortage risk) triggers, yet the 
reserve has not been activated to this day (12/20/2016).  
France/De-central obligation [5, 7, 8] 
France implemented a de-central obligation in 2015 with the first delivery to take place in 2017. 
All electricity suppliers are obliged to hold a certain number of certificates reflecting the share 
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of electricity consumption of their consumers during peak periods. These peak periods are 
determined by a security and temperature factor. The security factor takes into account the 
margins required to cover residual contingencies and the contribution of interconnections to 
security of supply. For the temperature factor, it is assumed that one-in-ten-year cold 
conditions occur every year. Certificates can either be purchased or obtained by certifying own 
generation and demand-side capacities. Foreign capacities located in neighboring countries 
are allowed to participate in consideration of the expected capacity of the respective 
interconnector at peak times. 
Sweden/Strategic reserve [9–13] 
Sweden established a strategic reserve already in 2003. Capacities are contracted on a yearly 
basis and need to be available from November 16 to March 15. Between 2009 and 2015, the 
reserve has been activated a total of nine times. Yearly costs for the reserve in 2013 and 2014 
amount to about 13 respectively 14 million EUR, which is significantly lower than the estimated 
costs of a shortage situation (90 million EUR). Plans to gradually phase-out thermal capacities 
in the strategic reserve by 2020 currently seem to be infeasible due to the large-scale phase-
out of nuclear capacities. 
Spain/Targeted capacity payment [1, 5, 14] 
Already in 1997, Spain introduced its first capacity remuneration mechanism. Major changes 
were made in 2007 when the mechanism was redesigned to adapt to the European law then 
in force. On the one hand, the new system should incentivize new investments by providing 
fixed capacity payments for 10 years, thus reducing investment risk. On the other hand, 
generation adequacy should be secured in the medium term (availability service) by 
establishing contracts with e.g. peak load power plants of a duration of one year or shorter. 
However, unforeseen events made it difficult to estimate the required generation capacity and 
long-term capacity payments. Due to the economic crisis and the resulting low electricity 
demand, in 2012 long-term capacity payments for investments were lowered and in 2013 
completely abolished. However, the availability service to prevent existing units from 
mothballing is still in place.  
United Kingdom/Central buyer [15–18] 
In order to maintain sufficient capacity helping to ensure security of supply, in 2014 the UK 
introduced centralized capacity auctions. The first delivery will take place in 2018, as the 
procurement is carried out 4 years in advance. In 2014, a capacity of 49.3 GW at a price of 
19.40 GBP/kW/year has been procured and in 2015, 46.4 GW at a price of 18.00 
GBP/kW/year. In 2016, the capacity and the price increased to 52.4 GW and 22.50 
GBP/kW/year respectively. So far, a total of 4.8 billion GBP have been paid to all participants, 
however, however, incentives for demand response and new investments have been limited.  
For example, of the total contracted capacity in 2015 less than 1% came from demand 
response and less than 2% from new investments. Additionally, despite being highly emission 
intensive, 650 MW of new diesel-fueled capacity were awarded contracts resulting in payments 
of 176 million GBP. Currently, foreign capacities are not allowed to participate in the auctions, 
however, cross-border transmission flows are considered in the calculation of the target 
capacity, which is determined by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy after consultation with the transmission system operator. 
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4 Conclusions 
One major goal of capacity remuneration mechanisms is to incentivize investments in secured 
capacity to ensure generation adequacy. In order to classify the mechanisms, a matrix with 
two dimensions is used. The first dimension distinguishes between market-wide or targeted 
mechanisms, which focus on specific technologies or criteria. In the second dimension, the 
way of allocating the capacity amount is differentiated. Price-based mechanisms set a target 
price and purchase the offered volume whereas volume-based approaches target a certain 
predefined capacity volume that results in an equilibrium price.  
Different mechanisms have been implemented in several European countries or will be 
introduced in the near future. This policy brief focuses on the strategic reserves in Belgium and 
Sweden, the de-central obligation in France, the targeted capacity payments in Spain and the 
central buyer mechanism in the UK. Generally, a strategic reserve is primarily implemented to 
guarantee generation adequacy, while a capacity market should particularly incentivize 
investments. 
The implementation of capacity remuneration mechanisms yielded mixed experiences so far. 
Weaknesses of the initial implementations lead to adjustments. As the prognosis of the 
required future capacity is highly complex, forecast errors could occur. In general, the 
implemented mechanisms, however, seem to have guaranteed a certain level of generation 
adequacy, as for instance in the UK the targeted capacity volumes could be purchased in the 
capacity auction. But the efficiency of installed capacity mechanisms in the market areas has 
not been sufficiently assessed yet. While on the one hand new mechanisms are introduced 
(e.g. decentral obligation in France), on the other hand, some mechanisms were already or 
are planned to be removed (e.g. capacity payments in Spain or the strategic reserve in 
Sweden). Hence, it can be concluded that in these countries capacity remuneration 
mechanisms are not required at this stage of structural changes in the electricity sector. This 
may change once volatile renewable energies reach a dominant share in electricity generation. 
Several measures could improve the political framework. Up to now, no EU-wide target for 
generation adequacy (or security of supply) has been defined. However, for assessing the 
need for capacity mechanisms, a specified target level could be advantageous. Besides, 
consistent methods and coordination on a European level are required to reduce uncertainties 
and inefficiencies. Capacity markets could have negative spillover effects on coupled markets 
due to lower prices induced by high capacity volumes. The generation adequacy level may 
then be lower in neighboring countries caused by missing investment incentives. So cross-
border effects have to be considered [19].  
The introduction of a mechanism can hinder cross-border electricity exchange and interfere 
with the process of an integrated European electricity market. The participation of 
interconnectors or capacities from non-domestic markets varies among countries and should 
be guaranteed to comply with the European Internal Market Directive. Therefore, improving 
transparency regarding procurement would be advantageous. 
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